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ABSTRACT
Attitudes to risk (known probabilities) and attitudes to ambiguity (unknown
probabilities) are separate constructs that influence decision making, but
their development across adolescence remains elusive. We administered a
choice task to a wide adolescent age-range (N = 157, 10–25 years) to
disentangle risk- and ambiguity-attitudes using a model-based approach.
Additionally, this task was played in a social context, presenting choices
from a high risk-taking peer. We observed age-related changes in ambigu-
ity-attitude, but not risk-attitude. Also, ambiguity-aversion was negatively
related to real-life risk taking. Finally, the social context influenced only risk-
attitudes. These results highlight the importance of disentangling risk- and
ambiguity-attitudes in adolescent risk taking.
Adolescence, which encompasses the developmental phase between childhood and adulthood, has
often been described as a period of increased risk taking (Crone & Dahl, 2012; Somerville, Jones, &
Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2008). Typically, risk taking is defined as choosing the option with the
highest outcome variability (Defoe, Dubas, Figner, & Van Aken, 2015), that is, an action that may
lead to greater benefits, but may also lead to negative outcomes, at the expense of certainty. During
adolescence engagement in substance abuse, deviant behavior, unprotected sex, and reckless driving
increase and peak (Eaton et al., 2008), often accompanied, if not strengthened, by the presence of
peers (Chassin et al., 2004; Simons-Morton, Lerner, & Singer, 2005). This potential rise in risk-taking
behavior is associated with pronounced neural changes in brain networks including subcortical
structures (such as the ventral striatum) and cortical regions (such as the prefrontal cortex). It has
been suggested that the different maturational rate of these brain regions, and their connectivity
patterns, lead to a “neural imbalance,” which may result in increased reward-sensitivity, risk taking,
peer susceptibility and attenuated impulse control (Casey, 2015; Crone & Dahl, 2012; Somerville &
Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2008). However, there are large individual differences (not all adolescents are
risk takers) and contextual influences (adolescents are not always risk takers) that are not yet well
understood (Casey, Jones, & Hare, 2008; Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011). The current research
examined determinants of risky decision making in adolescence, by testing the role of risk versus
ambiguity, and by examining the role of social influence on risk taking. These two contexts have
previously been found to play an important role in explaining variance in risk taking (Chein, Albert,
O’Brien, Uckert, & Steinberg, 2011; Tymula et al., 2012), but no study to date examined these factors
across adolescence in one comprehensive study.
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Risk and ambiguity
Although the outcomes of risky prospects are often certain (e.g., you know exactly how much you
may win or lose in a gambling game), the probabilities may be presented under different conditions
varying in uncertainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). First, risk taking can occur under conditions in
which the probabilities are known, reflecting explicit risk (e.g., the probability of heads in a coin toss
is 50%). Second, risk taking can occur under conditions in which the probabilities are not known,
reflecting ambiguous risk (e.g., the probability of causing an accident when driving through a red
light is unknown). Thus, in conditions of risk versus ambiguity the probabilities of different out-
comes vary in uncertainty. Indeed, real-life often presents ambiguous risks (driving through a red
light), rather than explicit risks (a coin toss). Prior developmental studies, however, have often used
paradigms that only involve gambles with known probabilities (Braams, Peters, Peper, Guroglu, &
Crone, 2014; Burnett, Bault, Coricelli, & Blakemore, 2010; Defoe et al., 2015; van Leijenhorst,
Westenberg, & Crone, 2008), or used paradigms that start out ambiguous but in which the ambiguity
is reduced over time via learning or experience (Chein et al., 2011; Crone & van der Molen, 2004;
Lejuez, Aklin, Zvolensky, & Pedulla, 2003; van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Bredman, & Huizenga, 2012)
and therefore cannot distinguish between these two elements of risk taking. Individuals’ risk-taking
behavior may be driven by both one’s attitude toward risk (i.e., a taste for risk, known probabilities)
and one’s attitude toward ambiguity (i.e., a tolerance for uncertainty, unknown probabilities)
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1992), indicating the importance of disentangling these attitudes in studies
on adolescent risk taking.
Previous research showed that adults tend to dislike both risk (von Gaudecker, van Soest, &
Wengström, 2011) and ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961) indicating that generally, adults are risk- and
ambiguity-averse. However, risk and ambiguity attitudes are correlated weakly at best (Levy,
Snell, Nelson, Rustichini, & Glimcher, 2010; Tymula, Rosenberg Belmaker, Ruderman, Glimcher,
& Levy, 2013), suggesting that these attitudes indeed reflect different elements of risk taking.
Most importantly, a recent study found pronounced differences in these elements of risk taking
in adolescents (12–17 years) and adults (30–50 years). Tymula et al. (2012) showed that although
both age groups were risk- and ambiguity-averse, adolescents were less ambiguity-averse, and
unexpectedly more risk-averse, than adults (Tymula et al., 2012). Also, ambiguity-attitude, but
not risk-attitude, was related to indices of adolescent real-life risk taking, particularly the
frequency of reckless behavior. These results highlight a relatively higher tolerance to ambiguity
in adolescence that may relate to the increased risk taking observed in adolescence compared to
adulthood (see Defoe et al., 2015). Additionally, a recent study comparing children (8–9 years)
with adults (19–27 years) (Li, Brannon, & Huettel, 2014), observed that despite an intact bias
towards the familiar (e.g., preferring known books over unknown books), ambiguity-aversion was
not yet present in childhood. This indicates that adolescence may be the start of developing
ambiguity-aversion as observed in adulthood, or may show unique risk- and ambiguity-tolerance
relative to children and adults. Thus, the exact developmental trajectory of risk- and ambiguity-
aversion remains unknown.
Here, we aim to further address this question by testing whether risk- and ambiguity-attitude
follow a linear trajectory (e.g., ambiguity-aversion increases with age) or a quadratic trajectory
(e.g., a tolerance to ambiguity peaking in adolescence) into young adulthood. Furthermore, we
explicitly aim to link individual differences in risk-and ambiguity-attitude with differences in self-
reported real-life risk-taking behavior and reward sensitivity. Self-report measures are an impor-
tant addition to the current study, as they serve as validation of our paradigm and explain how
risk taking in the laboratory reflects risk-taking behavior in real life. Specifically, we were inter-
ested in the behavior subscales of the Adolescent Risk-taking Questionnaire (ARQ, frequency of
risk-taking behaviors in daily life; Gullone, Moore, Moss, & Boyd, 2000), and the Behavioral
Inhibition System/Behavioral Approach System questionnaire (BIS/BAS, reward sensitivity; Carver
& White, 1994). These questionnaires have previously been associated with ambiguity-attitude
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(Tymula et al., 2012) and risk-taking tendencies in adolescence (Braams, Van Duijvenvoorde,
Peper, & Crone, 2015; van Duijvenvoorde et al., 2014), respectively.
Social influence
Besides a rise in risk-taking behavior, adolescents also show a shift in orientation toward peers, and
some have suggested that these processes are strongly related (Chein et al., 2011; Gardner &
Steinberg, 2005). For instance, risk-taking behavior typically takes place in groups and studies
have shown that merely the presence of peers may lead to increased risk taking (Gardner &
Steinberg, 2005) and greater activation in reward-sensitive areas in the brain during risk taking
(Chein et al., 2011; Steinberg, 2004). Although most studies until now have focused on peer
presence, peers may also be a source of information for choice behavior. Consistently, a recent
study with adults focused on the influence of observing peers’ choices (Chung, Christopoulos, King-
Casas, Ball, & Chiu, 2015). Specifically, it was shown that merely observing other people’s choice of
gambles changes the subjective value of those gambles. Also, in a study with adolescents (12–
17 years) and adults (18+ years), advice from an “expert economist” had stronger effects on
adolescents than on adults, with the adolescents approaching adult-like (i.e., risk-averse) risk-
attitudes in the presence of advice (Engelmann, Moore, Monica Capra, & Berns, 2012). These studies
suggest that information retrieved by observing others is integrated in one’s own choice process. As a
first step to test whether adolescents’ risk- and ambiguity-attitude is influenced by a social context,
we presented an additional condition in which adolescents were presented with the same gambles,
but in which choices from a high risk-taking peer were presented. Here, we focus particularly on the
shift in risk- and ambiguity-attitudes between the solo and the social condition.
The current study
Taken together, we aim to study the developmental trajectory of risk-and ambiguity-attitudes across
adolescence, and to what extent these attitudes relate to real-life risk-taking behavior. Second, we test
the influence of a social context on risk- and ambiguity-attitude across adolescence. Based on the few
previous studies we expect that developmental changes in risk-attitude are less pronounced com-
pared to changes in ambiguity-attitude, which may increase or peak particularly in early- to mid-
adolescence. Also, we expect that although both risk- and ambiguity-attitude may relate to indivi-
duals’ real-life risk-taking behavior, this relation may be stronger for ambiguity-attitude given that
this more likely reflects real-life risks (i.e., unknown probabilities rather than known probabilities).
Finally, we expect that a social context influences participants’ risk and ambiguity-attitudes, parti-
cularly in early- to mid-adolescence.
To these ends, we developed a wheel-of-fortune gambling task modeled after Tymula et al. (2012)
that included risky choices (known risks) and ambiguous choices (unknown risks) that was admi-
nistered to a wide adolescent age-group (ages 10–25, N = 162). A novel aspect of this study was that
we applied a model-based approach derived from economics to estimate individual’s risk- and
ambiguity-attitudes from this specific set of items (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989; Tymula et al.,
2012). This is a relatively new approach in developmental research (Tymula et al., 2012) and allows
to distinguish individuals’ subjective, rather than objective, preferences for risky and ambiguous
choices, a central question in economic theory (Camerer & Weber, 1992; Knight, 1921). In addition,
participants completed questionnaires on their individual level of risk taking in daily-life situations
(ARQ) and reward-sensitivity (BIS/BAS). This provides valuable information with respect to valida-
tion of our paradigm and how risk taking in the laboratory reflects real-life risky behavior.
Moreover, participants played these gambles by themselves (solo) or when choices from an age-
matched peer were present (social). Specifically, peer-choices were manipulated to include a more





One hundred sixty-two participants (85 female) ages 10–25 completed the wheel-of-fortune task.
Participants were recruited from a primary school (10–12-year-olds, n = 37), a secondary school
(14–16-year-olds, n = 40), higher vocational institutes (17–20-year-olds, n = 31), and universities
(21–25-year-olds, n = 52), in the Netherlands. Written informed consents were provided by the
participants themselves or by a parent in the case of minors. Recruitment, written informed consent,
and procedures were approved by the local ethics committee. Participants were given a flat rate of 10
Euro (21–25-year-olds) or a small present (10–20-year-olds) for their participation. Additionally, to
increase motivation and include a real-life consequence, participants were explained that one trial
would be randomly picked out from their choices and that they could win this amount via a lottery
in their class. Eventually, one participant from each class won his amount.
Five participants were excluded from all analyses: three because they did not show any variation
in choice behavior, making it impossible to estimate risk- and ambiguity-attitudes, and two for
violations of stochastic dominance in more than 50% of the trials. Stochastic dominance violations
occur when one option is better than another option in all respects, but the suboptimal option is
chosen (Birnbaum & Navarrete, 1998). In the current task, dominated choices occurred when
presented with a 5 Euro safe choice and a 5 Euro gamble (see task description). Choosing the
gamble would be a violation of stochastic dominance, as it is impossible to benefit from the gamble
compared to the safe option. Consistently violating stochastic dominance may indicate a limited
understanding of the task. These exclusion criteria have been applied before in Tymula et al. (2012,
2013). The final sample therefore included 157 individuals (84 female, Mage = 17.04 years,
SDage = 4.58, range = 10.00–25.63 years), evenly distributed over four continuous age groups (10–
12 years: n = 37, 19 female; 14–16 years: n = 39, 21 female; 17–20 years: n = 31, 12 female;
21–25 years: n = 50, 32 female). A χ2-test indicated no significant gender differences between age
groups (χ2 (3, N(157) = 5.01, p = .17). IQ was estimated for the three youngest age groups using a
short version of the Raven Standard Progressive Matrices (SPM; Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). The
average estimated IQ scores were within the normal range (M = 102.11, SD = 12.81), but correlated
with age (r = -.22, p = .023). However, adding IQ as a covariate in the subsequent analyses did not
result in any significant effects of IQ nor changed the results, indicating that intelligence did not
influence behavior on the task.
Wheel-of-fortune task
In a wheel-of-fortune task (see Figure 1), mimicked after Ernst et al. (2004) and Tymula et al. (2012),
participants were asked to make a series of choices between pairs of wheels. One consistent option
was a sure wheel that would always yield a gain of 5 Euro. The other option was a gambling wheel
that could yield higher gain-amounts, but also entailed a chance to win nothing (0 Euro), depicted
with blue (winning) and red (not winning) parts. The gain-amount, gain-probability, and ambiguity-
level associated with the gambling wheel varied from trial to trial, allowing to estimate participants
risk-attitude (to known probabilities) and ambiguity-attitude (to unknown probabilities). The
amount of gain varied between 5, 8, 20, and 50 Euro. In risky trials, the gain-probability of risky
gambling wheels (i.e., wheels with known probabilities) varied between 0.125, 0.25, 0.375, 0.50, 0.625,
and 0.75. In ambiguous trials, the gambling wheel was obscured by a grey lid that covered more or
less of the gambling wheel. The ambiguity-level of ambiguous gambling wheels (i.e., wheels with
unknown risks) varied between 25%, 50%, 75%, and 100% (see Figure 1C). In these ambiguous
wheels, the visible parts always included the same relative size of red and blue parts. Combining all
gain-amounts and gain-probabilities resulted in 24 unique risk trials, and combining all gain-
amounts and ambiguity-levels resulted in 16 unique ambiguous trials.
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Risky wheels were explained to the participants as wheels with winning (and not winning) parts
that could vary in size, indicating that the chance of winning (and not winning) could also vary.
Ambiguity levels were explained to the participants as a lid that could vary in size and hence cover
more or less of the gambling wheel. To ensure that participants understood that the blue and red
parts under the ambiguous lids could vary randomly, participants were explicitly shown all possible
wheels that could lie beneath each type of lid during instruction of the task.
The wheel of fortune task was played in a solo (Figure 1A) and a social condition (Figure 1B).
Participants played three repetitions of all unique risky and ambiguous trials in each condition,
resulting in a total of 240 trials (120 per condition).
In the solo condition, participants indicated their responses with a left or right button press,
without a maximum response time. After their decision a yellow selection frame appeared around
the chosen wheel. The social condition (Figure 1B) was similar to the solo condition, except that a
picture of a peer was included on screen (matching the participant’s age group and gender) during
each choice. Before the participant’s own choice, the choice of the peer was presented by a grey
selection frame around one of the wheels. Subsequently, the participants were able to indicate their
choice irrespective of the peer’s choice. For each age group and gender a set of 10 standardized
pictures were used (Gunther Moor, Crone, & Van der Molen, 2010). For each participant one of
these pictures was randomly drawn, matched for age group, and presented throughout the social
condition. Participants were explicitly instructed that the observed peer-choices were from another
participant of the same age. In reality, our peer-manipulation was programmed as a risk-taking peer,
Figure 1. A. Example of a risk trial in the solo condition. Participants were presented with a jittered fixation cross between
500–1,000 msec (with increments of 100 msec), after which the wheels appeared (a gambling wheel varying in gain-probability,
gain-amount, and ambiguity-level) and a sure wheel (a consistent gain of 5 Euro). After 1,000 msec a centered cue appeared,
allowing the participants to respond. A yellow selection frame (500 msec) confirmed the participant’s choice. B. Example of a risk
trial in the social condition. The timing of social trials was similar to the solo condition. In addition to the gambling wheel and the
sure wheel, an anonymous peer (matching the participant’s gender and age) appeared. After 1,000 msec this peer’s response
appeared, allowing the participants to respond. A yellow selection frame (500 msec) confirmed the participant’s choice. C.
Examples of the ambiguous gambling wheels. The lid could cover a varying proportion of the wheel.
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given that the cutoff of gambling for the peer was set to an objective expected value (EV) > 3 Euro of
the gambling wheel (i.e., the EV of the safe option was always 5 Euro), with the exception that the
peer did not violate stochastic dominance in the 5 Euro gambling items. These settings resulted in a
risk-attitude of the peer of α = 1.44 (indicating an extreme risk-seeking attitude), and an ambiguity-
attitude of β = –.85 (indicating an extreme ambiguity-seeking attitude). As a control measure, we
included four additional trials in which the peer did violate stochastic dominance. These trials were
added to check if participants would not blindly mimic the peer’s choices. However, this rarely
happened (i.e., 3.3% of the time).
All participants first played a solo block of trials followed by a social block. To account for order
effects, participants subsequently played another solo block followed by a social block, or vice versa
(counterbalanced across subjects). Preliminary one-way ANOVAs did not reveal an effect of block
order on overall gambling in risk trials (p = .95), nor on overall gambling in ambiguity trials (p = .36).
Last, to control for key preference and effects of attention, we counterbalanced the position of the blue
and red parts of the wheels (left, right, bottom, and top of the wheel), and the position of the
ambiguous lids (top or bottom of the wheel), across trials. That is, each stimulus had four possible
color configurations (except for the 50:50 explicit risky wheels and the 100% ambiguous wheels, which
had two possible color configurations), one of which was randomly chosen on each trial. Finally, the
different wheels (gamble, safe) were randomly displayed left and right on the screen.
Questionnaires and exit questions
To test for relations between estimated risk- and ambiguity-attitudes and indices of real-life risk taking,
participants completed the behavior scale of the ARQ (Gullone et al., 2000), a measure of one’s real-life
risk-taking behavior (as opposed to the perception scale of the ARQ, which is a measure of one’s
perception towards real-life risk taking; Gullone et al., 2000). That is, participants indicated on a 5-
point Likert scale the frequency with which they engaged in risky activities (with 1 indicating never and
5 indicating very often). Examples include “Snow skiing,” “Drinking and driving,” and “Having
unprotected sex.” The ARQ behavior scales consists of four subscales: Thrill-seeking, Rebellious,
Reckless, and Antisocial behavior. The ARQ has been validated in 925 participants between the ages
of 11 and 19 years old (Gullone et al., 2000). To test for relations with reward-sensitivity, participants
completed the BIS/BAS (Carver & White, 1994), which measures avoidant and appetitive motives for
reaching a desirable goal (e.g., reward sensitivity). This questionnaire contains 24 items on a 4-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very true for me) to 4 (very false for me). Examples include “When I get
something I want, I feel excited and energized” and “I crave excitement and new sensations.” The BIS/
BAS questionnaire consists of four subscales: BIS, BAS Fun Seeking, BAS Reward Responsiveness, and
BAS Drive. Due to class absence, eight participants did not complete the ARQ questionnaire (two
17–20-year-olds and six 21–25-year-olds), and nine participants did not complete the BIS/BAS
questionnaire (three 17–20-year-olds and the same six 21–25-year-olds).
Additionally, all participants completed a number of exit-questions about the anonymous peer in
the wheel of fortune task. These questions considered the participants’ opinion on how much they
believed the decisions of the peer, how wise they found the decisions of the peer, how smart they
found the peer, and how influenced they were by the decisions of the peer, on a scale from 0 to 9
with anchors not at all true for me and completely true for me.
Procedure
Participants played the wheel-of-fortune task individually in a quiet space at their school or
university. Instructions were delivered individually and before starting the task it was ensured all
participants understood the task. Participants were given a number of examples and completed seven
practice trials before starting. The wheel-of fortune task took approximately 20 minutes to complete.
Participants completed the Raven SPM, and the questionnaires on paper-and-pencil or online using
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Qualtrics (www.qualtrics.com) in a separate session from the wheel-of-fortune task. After the
experimental procedure, participants were debriefed by explaining that the choices of the peer
were computer-generated. Participants reported to modestly believe the decisions of the peer
(M = 3.44, SD = 2.18, range 0–9), but this did not correlate with age (p = .96), indicating all
participants reported to believe the decisions of the peer to a similar degree.
Data analyses
To check whether all participants had a basic understanding of the task (e.g., are sensitive to
increasing probability, ambiguity level, and amount), conventional ANOVAs were used on the
task data. These analyses set the stage for testing our hypotheses. For further analyses with model-
based estimations of risk and ambiguity-attitudes (hierarchical) multiple regressions were used.
Model-based analysis: Risk and ambiguity
Our main focus was to estimate risk- and ambiguity-attitudes of each participant using a model-
based approach and use these attitudes for subsequent analyses. The advantage of such a model-
based approach is twofold. First, it is an elegant way of estimating an integrative choice model that
simultaneously estimates risk- and ambiguity-attitude. Second, it allows for an explicit comparison
with previous studies using a similar model-based approach (Tymula et al., 2012, 2013), which has
been successfully applied to a developmental sample (Tymula et al., 2012).
To estimate the risk- and ambiguity-attitudes of each participant, we modeled the subjective value
(EU) of the choice option using a widely used power utility function with an additional term to
account for ambiguity-attitudes (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1989; Levy et al., 2010; Tymula et al., 2012):




where x represents the amount of money that could be won, p is the probability, A the ambiguity
level, α the risk-attitude, and β the ambiguity-attitude. In the current gain trials, an α = 1 indicates a
linear utility function and thus risk neutrality. An α < 1 indicates a concave utility function and thus
risk aversion, whereas α > 1 indicates convexity and thus risk seeking.
To obtain subjective value, the utility of an option was multiplied with the probability of outcome.
In this specific case, the level of ambiguity was taken into account. That is, p was the objective
probability of winning, and β was the individual ambiguity-attitude to be estimated. A is the
objective ambiguity-level. An ambiguity-neutral participant would have an estimated β = 0. An
ambiguity-averse participant would behave as if the winning probability was less than the objective
0.5 probability (β > 0). An ambiguity-seeking participant would behave as if the winning probability
was more than the objective 0.5 probability (β < 0).
We used the simplex algorithm of the general-purpose optimization toolbox (optim) in R for
model fitting (R Core Team, 2015). To model trial by trial choices we used a logistic choice rule to
compute the probability (PGamble) of choosing the risky/ambiguous option as a function of the
difference in subjective value EUGamble and EUSure. To account for the observed stochasticity in
choice, we also modeled the decisions of participants as susceptible to an error (μ):
Pr ChoseGambleð Þ ¼ 1




To account for local minima in estimated parameters this function was refitted using a grid search





In the following analyses we report the data from the solo condition only (but see “Risk- and
ambiguity-attitudes in the social condition”).
Stochastic dominance violation
To investigate understanding of the choice task, we determined first-order stochastic dominance
violations. That is, in some trials, subjects chose between a sure gain of 5 Euro and a gambling wheel
that offered a risky or an ambiguous chance of winning 5 Euro. In such trials it is impossible to benefit by
choosing the gambling wheel. Thus, an economically rational subject should always choose the certain
amount over the gamble (but see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). The participants (after exclusions, see
“Participants”) rarely chose this gambling wheel (M = .02, SD = .07). A linear regression revealed no
significant age effect on choosing this lottery over the sure gain (p = .28). This indicates that although
subjects occasionally violate dominance, this rarely happened in the current task and age-range.
Sensitivity to gain-probability, ambiguity-level, and gain-amount
Next, to investigate understanding of the task, we tested participants’ choice behavior in response to
changes in level of gain-probability, ambiguity-level, and gain-amount in conventional repeated
measures ANOVAs with age group as a between-subjects variable. These revealed significant main
effects on choice behavior of gain-probability, ambiguity-level, and gain-amount, with higher gain-
probability, lower ambiguity-level, and higher gain-amount leading to an increased likelihood to
gamble (all p’s < .001). No significant interactions with age group were found (all p’s > .09), and
visualization of these effects indicated highly similar patterns across the four equally-spaced age
groups (see Figure 2). Thus, all participants indicated a basic understanding of the task.
Finally, we compared gambling in the ambiguous items to gambling in the 50:50 explicit risky
items. Considering that this is how one should treat an ambiguous gamble (i.e., with a 50% chance of
winning, Tymula et al., 2012), less gambling in ambiguous items versus this option would indicate
ambiguity aversion. Indeed, participants generally gambled less in the ambiguous items (M = .28,
SD = .16), compared to the 50:50 explicit risky items (M = .46, SD = .17), as shown by a paired
samples t-test (t(156) = −14.35, p < .001). This replicates prior studies (Ellsberg, 1961; Levy et al.,
2010) and sets the stage for testing our hypotheses on risk- and ambiguity-attitudes.
Risk- and ambiguity-attitude: Model-based analyses
To more formally estimate individuals’ risk- and ambiguity-attitude we used a model-based
approach (Tymula et al., 2012, 2013), see Methods for further specification. When plotting the
individually estimated risk- and ambiguity-attitudes we observed that people were generally risk-
Figure 2. Visualization per age group of the effects of gain-probability (A), ambiguity-level (B) and gain-amount (C), on proportion
of gambling.
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and ambiguity-averse (see Figure 3A for a visualization of the data). That is, most risk-attitudes (α’s)
were < 1 (M = .57, SD = .24) and most ambiguity-attitudes (β’s) were > 0 (M = .43, SD = .32).
Our main goal was to test for linear and quadratic age effects on risk- and ambiguity-attitudes.
Hierarchical multiple regressions, with the linear effect of age as the first predictor and the quadratic
effect of age as the second predictor, revealed no significant linear age effect on estimated risk-
attitude (p = .25), nor a quadratic effect of age (p-change = .79). To test whether gender would have
an effect on risk-attitude, we added gender as a third predictor above age linear and age quadratic.
The model with gender explained additional variance (ΔR2 = .04, F-change(1,153) = 4.75,
p-change = .031, b = .08, SE = .04), and showed that males (M = .61, SD = .24) were slightly more
risk-seeking than females (M = .53, SD = .24). No significant interactions between age (linear or
quadratic) and gender were observed.
A similar analysis with estimated ambiguity-attitude showed that ambiguity-aversion increased
linearly with age (R2 = .034, F(1,155) = 5.40, p = .021, b = .01, SE = .006), but did not show a
quadratic effect of age (p-change = .41). No significant main effect of gender, nor interactions
between gender and age were observed. Thus, ambiguity-attitude, but not risk-attitude, changed
significantly with age. A correlation between these attitudes showed that risk- and ambiguity-attitude
were not significantly correlated (r = .05, p = .51).
Individual differences
Next, we aimed to test whether the estimated risk- and ambiguity-attitudes were related to indices of
self-reported real-life risk taking behaviors (ARQ; Gullone et al., 2000) and reward sensitivity (BIS/
BAS; Carver & White, 1994).
First, we observed that self-reported risk taking (ARQ) increased linearly across age for reckless
behavior (b = .07, SE = .009, p < .001), rebellious behavior (b = .18, SE = .015, p < .001), and
antisocial behavior (b = .06, SE = .01, p < .001). To test which ARQ subscale(s) best explained risk-
and ambiguity-attitudes, we performed multiple regressions (using backward selection), with risk-
and ambiguity-attitudes as dependent variables and the ARQ subscales as independent variables. To
control for age (linear), this variable was always included in the model. We observed that ambiguity-
attitude was best explained by the model with age and ARQ Reckless behavior (R2 = .07,
F(2,146) = 5.19, p = .007). As reported above, ambiguity-aversion increased linearly with age
(b = .02, SE = .007, p = .002). Interestingly, reckless behavior was negatively related to ambiguity-
attitude, with more reckless behavior related to less ambiguity-aversion (b = –.11, SE = .05, p = .041,
see Figure 3C). No significant models were observed for risk-attitude.
Figure 3. A. Risk-attitude (y-axis) across age (x-axis). α’s smaller than 1 indicate risk-aversion, whereas α’s larger than 1 indicate
risk-seeking. Most subjects across all ages were risk-averse and this did not change with age. B. Ambiguity-attitude (y-axis) across
age (x-axis). β’s larger than 0 indicate ambiguity-aversion, whereas β’s smaller than zero indicate ambiguity-seeking. Most subjects
were ambiguity-averse, and this aversion increased linearly with age. C. Relation between the ARQ Reckless behavior scale
(controlled for age) and ambiguity-attitude. More reckless behavior was related to less ambiguity-aversion.
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Because some of the items of the Reckless behavior scale might not have been applicable to the
youngest participants (e.g., “Having unprotected sex”), we inspected the relation between ambiguity-
aversion and reckless behavior for participants of 14 years and older (leaving n = 110 participants),
using a partial correlation (controlling for age). A similar effect was observed in which risk-taking
behavior tended to be related to ambiguity-attitude (r –.18, p = .059), but not to risk-atti-
tude (p = .87).
Second, for self-reported reward-sensitivity (BIS/BAS) we observed that BAS Drive increased
linearly with age (b = .14, SE = .035, p < .001). BAS Reward responsiveness showed a quadratic
pattern (b = .02, SE = .01, p = .035), which was best described as an emerging pattern of increased
reward responsivity in young adulthood. However, the BIS/BAS subscales were not related to either
risk- or ambiguity-attitude.
Risk- and ambiguity-attitudes in the social condition
We added a first step in the current study to test for context effects of risk- and ambiguity-attitudes.
Particularly we aimed to test to what extent the social condition influenced risk- and ambiguity-
attitudes. To this end we calculated risk- and ambiguity-attitudes in the social condition with the
same model-based approach as in the solo condition (see Methods for model specification). One
participant (a late adolescent) did not complete the social blocks of the task due to time constraints,
leading to n = 156 in further analyses on the social condition.
To assess the influence of the social condition on participants’ attitudes, we first ran a repeated
measures ANOVA on risk-attitudes, with condition (solo, social) as a within factor, and the linear
and quadratic effects of age as covariates. With respect to risk-attitude, we observed a significant
main effect of condition (F(1,153) = 5.37, p = .022, ηp
2 = .034), with participants becoming more
risk-seeking in the social condition (M = .59, SE = .02) compared to the solo condition (M = .56,
SE = .02). In addition, we observed a significant age (linear)*condition interaction (F(1,153) = 4.06,
p = .046, ηp
2 = .026), and an age (quadratic)*condition interaction at trend level (F(1,153) = 3.56,
p = .061, ηp
2 = .023). We have visualized these age effects in Figure 4A, where we have plotted the
difference score between risk-attitude in the social condition minus the solo condition. A similar
analysis on ambiguity-attitude showed no significant effects of condition, or age (see Figure 4B).
When gender was included, this factor did not interact with condition or condition*age effects in
Figure 4. A. Visualization of the difference between the social minus the solo condition for risk-attitude, plotted per age group.
Note that a positive score means individuals became more risk-seeking in the social condition compared to the solo condition.
Particularly the youngest ages became more risk-seeking in the social compared to the solo condition. B. Visualization of the
difference between the social minus the solo condition for ambiguity-attitude, plotted per age group. A positive score means
individuals became more ambiguity-averse, wheras a negative score means individuals became more ambiguity-seeking in the
social condition compared to the solo condition. There was no significant effect of the social condition. Error bars represent +1/–1
SE around the mean.
86 N. E. BLANKENSTEIN ET AL.
both the risk- and ambiguity-attitudes analyses. To control for the self-report rating of peer
believability, we added this rating as a covariate in addition to the linear and quadratic effect of
age on the ANOVA for risk-attitude. This analysis revealed no significant interaction between the
believability rating and condition (p = .424), nor did it change the results, indicating that this rating
did not influence the effect of condition that we observed.
Discussion
This study focused on distinguishing determinants of risky choice across adolescence by testing
attitudes toward risk (contexts with explicit probabilities) and ambiguity (contexts with unknown
probabilities) across adolescence (ages 10–25 years). We observed that ambiguity-attitude, but not
risk-attitude, changed with age, with younger adolescents being more ambiguity-tolerant (i.e., less
averse) than older adolescents and young adults. Moreover, ambiguity-attitude, but not risk-attitude,
was related to self-reported real-life reckless behavior, with less ambiguity-averse attitudes related to
more reckless behavior. Finally, we observed an effect with respect to the social condition: risk-, but
not ambiguity-attitude, tended to change between the solo and social context, with participants
becoming more risk-seeking in the social context. The discussion is organized alongside the line of
these main findings.
Risk- and ambiguity-attitudes across adolescence
Age effects
First, we tested for age-related changes in individuals’ risk and ambiguity-attitudes. Model fits
showed that most participants were risk-averse and ambiguity-averse, as has been observed in
adult studies (Ellsberg, 1961; Levy et al., 2010; Von Gaudecker et al., 2011), but note that consider-
able individual differences were present (see Figure 3A an 3B). Over the course of adolescence,
ambiguity-aversion increased monotonically into early adulthood. In contrast, we observed no age-
related differences in risk-aversion. These findings highlight a distinct developmental trajectory of
risk- versus ambiguity-attitude, which concurs with findings that these attitudes separately drive
risk-taking behavior (Tymula et al., 2012) and are uncorrelated (Levy et al., 2010), a pattern we also
observe in this study.
The finding that ambiguity-aversion increases with age replicates prior research (Tymula et al.,
2012) that showed that adolescents were more ambiguity-tolerant than adults. However, our results
extend this finding by showing that ambiguity-tolerance was highest in the youngest ages (10–
12 years) and decreases into young adulthood. Prior research found that children (8–9 years) did not
yet show ambiguity-aversion (Li et al., 2014). That is, when children and adults were asked which
gamble they preferred (a risky or an ambiguous gamble), children were equally likely to choose the
ambiguous or the risky option, whereas adults chose the risky option more often. In addition,
children were willing to pay as much for betting on an ambiguous gamble versus a risky gamble,
whereas adults were willing to pay more for the risky gamble. Both findings highlight that children,
in contrast to adults, did not yet distinguish between risk and ambiguity (Li et al., 2014). Possibly,
early adolescence is the start of ambiguity aversion in decision making, a question that should be
addressed in future research including even younger children.
In contrast, risk-attitudes did not change significantly across adolescence. Previous studies using
paradigms with known probabilities have generally shown little age differences in overall risk-taking
levels (Eshel, Nelson, Blair, Pine, & Ernst, 2007; van Leijenhorst et al., 2008; Wolf, Wright, Kilford,
Dolan, & Blakemore, 2013). This absence of age differences has been explained by relatively mature
cognitive abilities, and understanding of probabilities, in adolescence (van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen,
Visser, & Huizenga, 2010; van Leijenhorst et al., 2008). On the other hand, heightened adolescent
risk taking has been shown in explicit risky-choice paradigms when immediate rewards and losses
are present, resulting in a “hot” decision context (Burnett et al., 2010; Figner, Mackinlay, Wilkening,
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& Weber, 2009). Thus, under conditions of known probabilities, age differences may appear only
under higher emotional load, although future research should formally address this hypothesis.
Age-related change may be more pronounced in ambiguous decision-tasks such as the Iowa
Gambling Task (IGT; Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000), the Balloon Analogue Risk taking Task
(BART; Lejuez et al., 2003) and the Stoplight task (Chein et al., 2011). A comparison of a non-
informed (“ambiguous”) and informed (risky) IGT, also observed that particularly in the ambiguous
task, choice behavior became more advantageous across adolescence (van Duijvenvoorde et al.,
2012). However, most of these ambiguous decision-tasks include immediate feedback, which may
result in a heightened emotional load, but also inherently drive learning. Learning may explain some
of these age-related changes in decision making (Eppinger, Hämmerer, & Li, 2011; van
Duijvenvoorde et al., 2012; van Duijvenvoorde, Jansen, Griffioen, van der Molen, & Huizenga,
2013). The current study is, to our knowledge, one of the first to compare adolescents’ risk taking
under risky (known) and ambiguous (unknown) decision contexts in a task that does not require
learning. Our finding that ambiguity-attitude was driven by age-related change and risk-attitude was
not, suggests that ambiguity may differently influence risk taking across adolescence, and is perhaps
a better reflection of real-life risk taking, in which age differences are prominent.
Individual differences
This relation between attitudes and real-life risk taking was further tested by relations with self-
report risk-taking measures. We observed that with increasing age, reckless behavior (such as
drinking and driving) increased. Interestingly, we observed that this scale was related to ambigu-
ity-, but not risk-attitude. Specifically, more ambiguity-aversion was related to less real-life reckless
behavior. This finding highlights that ambiguity-attitude may be a characteristic that is particularly
driving individuals’ real-life risk-taking tendencies, and is consistent with findings in a previous
study relating ambiguity-attitudes and self-reported risk taking, particularly reckless behavior
(Tymula et al., 2012). Given the relatively modest effect observed in the current study, this relation
needs to be replicated in further studies, and extended to adolescent populations with a wider range
of risk-taking behaviors (i.e., with less and more extreme risk-taking tendencies).
Prior research has defined reckless behavior as actions that carry strong connotations of serious
negative consequences, such as injury and death (Arnett, 1992). Indeed, the ARQ reckless behavior
subscale of Gullone et al. (2000) consists of items such as “Drinking and driving,” “Speeding,”
“Having unprotected sex,” and “Stealing cars and going for joy rides,” all of which can have a strong
negative long-term impact, and may be typically framed in the domain of health-safety decisions
(Blais & Weber, 2006; Figner & Weber, 2011). Whether ambiguity-attitude specifically relates to
behavior in the health-safety domain is an interesting question for further research (e.g., Van
Duijvenvoorde, Blankenstein, Crone, & Figner, under review). Tentatively it may be suggested that
explicit decision-making tasks reflect real-life risk taking to a lesser degree than ambiguous tasks,
because risks in real-life rarely present known probabilities.
Although we did not observe a relation between real-life risk taking and risk-attitude, nor in
reward-sensitivity and risk-attitude, there were considerable individual differences in aversion to
risk. Whether individual differences in risk-attitudes reflect other aspects of real-life risk taking, or
perhaps more cognitive aspects of risk taking (understanding of probability, intelligence, etc.) will
need to be determined in future studies.
Social context
Finally, we explored whether risk- and ambiguity-attitude changed between a solo and a social
context, in which choices from a high risk-taking peer were presented. The social context tended to
only influence risk-attitude, with individuals becoming more risk-seeking in the social context. This
shift in risk-attitudes significantly differed with age. When we plotted the difference between the
social minus the solo condition, as a measure of the effect of the social condition, we observed
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the effect was strongest in the youngest age group (10–12 years). Thus these findings indicate an
overall sensitivity to peers’ choices, but strongest in this age range. Finally, this finding seems to
indicate that people are somewhat more swayed by peer behavior in explicit risk compared to
ambiguous conditions. This suggest that risk taking may vary under different conditions of social
advice. Prior studies have demonstrated peer effects on adolescent risk taking in both ambiguous
(Chein et al., 2011; Gardner & Steinberg, 2005) and more explicit risk taking tasks (Smith, Chein, &
Steinberg, 2014) although few explicitly compared these risk-taking situations. Future studies will
need to confirm whether peers have more, or similar, effects in risky and ambiguous contexts
compared to the current study.
When presenting peer’s choices it has been suggested that the combination of individuals’
behavior and peer behavior may also play an important role in the level of peer influence. That is,
a recent study showed that although peer behavior may influence individuals’ risk taking, this
influence was greater when peer choices were aligned with individual preferences (Chung et al.,
2015). That is, for risk-averse individuals the influence of safe peer choices will be greater (i.e., a bias
in conforming to safe options) than risky peer choices, and vice versa. Here, we only used risky peer
choices (in a relative risk- and ambiguity-averse sample). An interesting next step may be to include
both risk-averse and risk-seeking peers. In combination with a model-based approach (see Chung
et al., 2015), such a design may disentangle individual differences in adolescents’ conformity to peers
across risky and ambiguous contexts.
Limitations and future directions
To our knowledge, the current study is the first to compare risk- and ambiguity-attitudes across a
wide adolescent age-range, using a validated model-based approach. However, this study also
suffered from some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, we did not have
estimates of IQ for the oldest age group. However, we believe it is unlikely IQ would have had an
effect on task behavior for the oldest age group, because (1) all age groups showed similar sensitivity
to gain-probability, ambiguity-level and gain-amounts and (2) IQ did not appear to influence task
behavior in the three younger age groups. Nevertheless, future studies should include an IQ
assessment for all participants from all ages.
Second, although a Chi-square test indicated that there were no significant gender differences
across the different age groups, gender was not well matched across the two older age groups, with
particularly more males than females in the 17–20-year-old group, and more females than males in
the 21–25-year-old group. However, when including gender in our analyses, results of age-related
changes in risk- and ambiguity-attitude, or the effect of social context, did not change. We observed
that in general males were more risk-seeking, but not more ambiguity-seeking, than females. This
finding is in line with previous studies showing that generally, males are more risk taking (Byrnes,
Miller, & Schafer, 1999; van Leijenhorst et al., 2008). In future studies it is important to have an
equal distribution of both genders in each age group to test the role of gender in more detail.
Third, in the current study the self-reported believability of the social manipulation ranged from
very low to very high, but was relatively low overall. Including peer-believability as a covariate did not
influence our results of the social condition, in which we particularly observed that people became
more risk-seeking when presented with a risk-seeking peer. It may be the case that this explicit self-
report is not a reliable measure, because it may have resulted in the participants actively questioning
the peer, whereas they may not have done this throughout the experiment. Nonetheless, future studies
should for instance increase the personal association felt with a social-influence group (e.g., Knoll,
Magis-Weinberg, Speekenbrink, & Blakemore, 2015), or perform control experiments to compare
social versus non-social influence (e.g., Klucharev, Hytönen, Rijpkema, Smidts, & Fernández, 2009).
Fourth, the current study focused particularly on the gain domain, which may have caused our
participants to be particularly risk-averse. That is, individuals tend to be relatively risk-averse when
gains are at stake, but risk-seeking when losses are at stake (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). Future
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studies could benefit from also including a loss domain, which may provide better insight of risky
choice across adolescence under conditions varying in uncertainty.
Finally, we investigated age as an important factor of interest, but we did not include puberty
measurements. Puberty typically starts between ages 10–13 and influences structural and functional
development of limbic and prefrontal systems (Peper & Dahl, 2013). Pubertal development appears to
contribute to increased adolescent sensation-seeking (Forbes & Dahl, 2010) and reward-sensitivity, as
shown by heightened neural activation in the nucleus accumbens (Braams et al., 2015). These findings
suggest that pubertal development may relate to individual differences in risk- and ambiguity-attitude.
Future research may further establish the relation between risk- and ambiguity-attitudes, puberty, and
the associated neural development.
Conclusion
The current study highlights the potential of a model-based approach to decompose overt risk-taking
levels into underlying determinants of adolescent risk taking: risk- and ambiguity-attitudes. These
distinct influences on risk taking were found to have different developmental trajectories, and
provide complementary insights into adolescent risky decision making. This study confirmed an
emerging ambiguity-aversion across adolescent development, and its relation with risk taking in
daily life, and provides suggestions for including a social context in future adolescent risk-taking
research. Future studies using neuroimaging methods may allow us to further understand the
underlying mechanisms of these separate aspects of risk taking, which may impact adolescent
risky decision making in different ways.
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